[2007]JRC251
royal court
(Samedi Division)
20th December 2007
Before :
|
F. C. Hamon, Esq., O.B.E., Commissioner, and
Jurats Le Breton and King.
|
REPRESENTATION OF DSL (R) LIMITED.
IN THE MATTER OF THE DSL REMUNERATION
TRUST.
Advocate L. K. A. Richardson for the
Representor.
Advocate R. J. MacRae for the Trustee.
judgment
the commissioner:
1.
The
Representor in this case is a limited liability company under Scots law. Its principal place of business is at Dundee.
Advocate Richardson,
for the Representor and the principal shareholders of the Representor, Mr and
Mrs L, has requested that their names be made anonymous. We accede to that request.
2.
The
Trustee, A Trust Company (Jersey) Limited, is the trustee of an English law
trust known as the DSL Remuneration Trust (the "Trust") which is a
remuneration trust established by the Representor on 25th April,
2000. The founder of the Trust was
the Representor. On 18th May 2000,
the Representor entered into two deeds of assignment and transferred two retail
shops in Scotland
and all their goodwill, fixtures, fittings and equipment in each shop free of
all liens and charges to the Trust.
The business (although not the two retail shops) was sold in June 2000,
and the proceeds of sale were transferred to the Trust in July 2000.
3.
The terms
of the Trust prevent any outright distribution being made or indeed any
benefits being provided to Mr and Mrs L, each of whom is an equal sharing
"participator" in the Representor as founder of the Trust, or to
their two sons, who are "persons connected with" Mr and Mrs L as
participators in the Representor as founder. All of these persons fall into the
definition of Excluded Persons under the terms of the Trust. The Trustee is advised that the
provision of an interest free loan to any Excluded Person would constitute a
benefit which is prohibited by the terms of the Trust. We have had careful regard to the recent
case of In the matter of the A Trust Company Limited [2007] JRC 184
which involved a similar form of trust and similar circumstances, and indicates
that there is no way that Mr and Mrs L or their two sons could ever derive any
benefit from the assets of the Trust.
This is not what Mr and Mrs L were told when the Trust was set up. They were told specifically that they
would be able to receive loans from the trust fund, interest free, and without
having to provide security. As
Chancery counsel (advising the Trustee) said as recently as 10th December, 2007:–
“The terms of the settlement
clearly provide that employees of the company are beneficiaries and yet Miss
Shortt of Baxendale Walker advised Mr L that they would not receive any
benefit. Yet there is apparently a duty on the trustees to exhaust the capital
and income of the trust fund under Clause 4 of the settlement. It is
hard” (we
would say impossible) “to reconcile the
terms of the settlement with what Mr and Mrs L were told”.
4.
We have
been provided with a very full and detailed bundle of documents by Advocate
Richardson. We have heard from
Advocate MacRae for the Trustee and we heard from Mr Coleman, a former
long-standing employee of the Representor who was convened by the Royal Court
to represent the beneficiaries of the Trust namely the present past and future
employees of the Representor and the wives, husbands, widows, widowers,
children, step-children and remoter issue of such employees, and the spouses
and former spouses (whether or not remarried) of such children and remoter
issue. His statement and his
evidence leave us in no doubt that his words are correct when he says:–
“I can guarantee to the
Court that neither myself nor any other previous employee have any intention of
ever making a claim from or against the trust”.
5.
The
goodwill of the business of the Representor was sold on 9th June, 2000, but the
Representor remains in the ownership and control of Mr and Mrs L. The current assets of the Trust are
valued at approximately £1.8 million and comprise (as we have said) the
two retail properties in Scotland,
together with the accumulated rental income derived from those properties and
cash.
6.
Loans of
some £280,000 were in fact made to a company connected with the Trustee,
which in turn entered into further finance agreements with Mr L. The terms of the loan were that they
were interest bearing but unsecured.
Those loans have been repaid with interest.
7.
It appears
that, as in the case of the A Trust referred to above, the Trust was
established and the transactions entered into on the basis of tax and legal
advice received from a then firm of English solicitors, Messrs Baxendale
Walker. The Trustee was informed by
Paul Baxendale Walker that he had obtained English Counsel's advice in
connection with the efficacy of the Trust. Neither the Trustee nor Mr and Mrs L
(or through them, the Representor) ever saw that advice from English Counsel
but relied throughout on the advice obtained from Baxendale Walker.
8.
As to the
advice given to Mr L by Messrs Baxendale Walker, we have the handwritten notes
of Mr L, and in fact Mr L followed this up with a telephone call some days
later. The advice that he received
was, it now appears, wrong, for the reasons set out at paragraph 3 above. Mr L says in his affidavit that he spoke
to Miss Sharon Shortt of Baxendale Walker:–
“I then specifically
asked her about point 4.6.3 in the Trust Deed which states: “controlling
shareholders are excluded from benefit under the Trust”. She confirmed that this was the essence
of the structure and was the reason that: a) we would have to access our funds
by way of loan and b) this method of withdrawal would therefore exempt us from
liability to UK taxation as there is no liability to income tax or any other
tax.
This was also not a benefit as
it was to be done on a loan basis, albeit a deep discounted loan basis, which
would give further benefit to my family at the time of my death. At this point, I asked if we were using
a loophole in the law and could this be closed retrospectively. She replied that this was not a
loophole, and was constructed by Paul Baxendale Walker using case law and
Inland Revenue manuals. In order to
change the law retrospectively, this would mean repealing the relevant laws and
would be impossible as it was based on case law going back hundreds of years.
After the call, I asked Mr
Walker if I should get another solicitor’s opinion. His advice was that there was nothing to
stop me, but in his opinion, there was no need as Baxendale Walker was a legal
firm of some repute and I had already paid out a considerable sum for their
technical advice. This would only
lead to more unnecessary cost. I
accepted this advice.”
(We should point out that the Mr Walker
that Mr L spoke to is not connected to the firm of Baxendale Walker).
9.
Mr L comes
over as a cautious but caring individual. He was given the wrong advice. His handwritten notes, his affidavit and
all the attendant documentation lead us ineluctably to the conclusion that
there has been a mistake. As he
says in the conclusion to his affidavit made on 21st November, 2007:–
“I have never in my life
wanted to do anything illegal and had no intention to do anything which was
wrong in this instance. I was told
that this was a legal and legitimate scheme and a commonly used tax advantage
model. I did raise queries but
these were dealt with and I relied on the advice of my accountant and Baxendale
Walker as well as the representatives of the trustee. If at any time anyone had
told me that I would be signing away my assets, I would not have done so. Having said that, I appreciate that when
I said the whole thing was too good to be true, it obviously was”.
10. While the Trustee is resident in Jersey, the Trust is governed by English law and it is to
English law that we must turn in considering whether the mistake that was made
was such as to lead to the Trust and the deeds of assignment being set aside as
invalid on the ground of mistake, as sought by the Representor. We have the benefit of the advice of two
English Chancery counsel, Miss Penelope Reed for the Representor and Mr D A
Hochberg for the Trustee. Both
Counsel are in agreement and both recommend that the Trust be set aside by the
Court as invalid on the ground of mistake. Mr Hochberg says:–
“Lloyd LJ carried out a
comprehensive review of the equitable jurisdiction to set aside voluntary
transactions for mistake in Sieff v Fox [2005] 1 WLR 3811. He analysed the cases and said (at p.
3844-5)
‘Clearly there is a
jurisdiction to set aside a voluntary disposition for mistake (as there is also
to rectify such an instrument to accord with the donor’s true
intentions). The mistake must be as
to the effect of the disposition.
The discrepancy may arise from a legal defect in the disposition itself
.. or from a mistake of fact as to the position under the relevant trusts or as
to the effect of the disposition in the hands of the donee. It may arise from a misunderstanding of
the nature of the trusts which would affect the property after the disposition,
due to a failure on the part of the advisers to explain the position
properly. According to Gibbon v
Mitchell [1960] 1 WLR 1304, the mistake must be as to the effect of the
disposition, and a mistake as to its consequences is not sufficient. A misunderstanding as to (the fiscal
consequences of the transaction) would not justify setting the transaction
aside’.”
11.
On the basis of the evidence of Mr and Mrs L and that of the Trustee, Mr
and Mrs L, the two directors and shareholders of the Representor, were under a
mistake of fact as to the position under the relevant trusts. Mr and Mrs L were, of course, not the
settlors of the Trust. But they
were the two directors of the Representor as settlor. In the case of a company which acts
through the agency of its directors, the intentions of its directors are the
intentions of the company. The
evidence of Mr and Mrs L is therefore the primary evidence as to the intention of the Representor
as settlor when entering into the transaction. It seems to us that the mistake of fact
on the part of Mr and Mrs L as to the position which would obtain after the Representor
had transferred the proceeds of sale of the business to the Trustee to hold on
the trusts of the Trust was a mistake as to the effect of the transaction. The mistake made by Mr and Mrs L, and,
through them, the Representor, was that
they thought that they would be able to receive loans from the Trust fund
interest free and without having to provide security. The position as it now stands is that
the Trustee has now been advised that Mr and Mrs L cannot receive any sums,
whether absolutely or by way of loan (and certainly not any loan other than at
a commercial rate of interest and made against security), nor can their sons
receive any sum from the Trust fund after their deaths. In our view this
mistake as to the effect of the transaction entered into falls within Gibbon
v Mitchell, as that case has in
turn been explained in Sieff v Fox, and the equitable jurisdiction to
set aside the Trust for mistake is engaged.
12. That is not, however, an end of the matter,
since the court has a discretion whether to set aside a transaction. Sieff v Fox makes clear that the
basis for the jurisdiction to be exercised is that it would be unjust for the transaction not to
be set aside. The Court has taken
two important factors into account when deciding whether to exercise the
discretion to set aside the Trust on the grounds of the mistake of the settlor
as to its legal effect. First, the
question arises whether it would be unjust on the beneficiaries named under the
Trust. Mr
Coleman by his statement and through the letters that he has received from some
of the former employees, has made it pellucid that the former employees of the
Representor have received all the contractual remuneration to which they may be
or may have been entitled and that they do not regard themselves as having any
claim over or interest in the Trust assets. They support the Trust being set aside
on the ground of the mistake made by the Representor through Mr and Mrs L. Second, there are no legal commitments
outstanding by the Trustee to third parties.
13. We are satisfied on the evidence that we have
read and heard that the Representor, through Mr and Mrs L as its directors and
shareholders, was under a mistake of fact as to the position under the trusts
of the Trust, and we set aside the Trust and the deeds of assignment on that
basis.
Authorities
In
the matter of the A Trust Company Limited
[2007] JRC 184.
Sieff v Fox [2005] 1 WLR 3811.
Gibbon v Mitchell [1960] 1 WLR 1304.